Introduction
Early-stage investments are increasingly recognized as a critical input in human capital production. These investments in the formation of human capital have dynamic impacts on outcomes at subsequent stages. Recent literature demonstrates that prenatal and early childhood nutrition status significantly determines a child's readiness for schooling and educational and labor market outcomes (Alderman et al. 2001; Alterman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey, 2006; Maluccio et al. 2009; Yamauchi 2008) . The dynamic path of human capital formation depends on early-stage investments essentially due to the cumulative nature of its formation (Cunha et al. 2006 ).
School education is not an exception. For instance, children cannot perform well at higher grades without sufficient acquisition of knowledge at lower grades. The high rates often observed of repeating early grades in elementary school show that many children face difficulty in successfully starting schooling, indirectly proving the importance of initialstage investments in determining higher grade performance (Behrman and Deolalikar, 1991) . Similarly, successful completion at the elementary school stage is a significant factor in student performance at the secondary school stage. This paper assesses the impact of a large-scale intervention to elementary schools, the Third Elementary Education Project (TEEP), on students' learning performance in the physical and soft components and institutional reform. Besides investing in physical buildings and textbooks, TEEP provided training to teachers and principals and introduced school-based management by partnering school with community. Our study estimates the total impacts of these investments and reforms on students' learning performance, measured by a change in student test scores during the elementary school cycle, though we expect that such an intervention has longer term effects beyond this stage, changing their activities in labor markets. Methodologically, we combine double differences with propensity score matching. We compare the change in test scores before and after the intervention in TEEP-treated schools with the change in nontreated schools. Propensity score matching is used to reduce the pre-intervention differences between the treated and nontreated schools. We find that a two-year exposure to the TEEP intervention significantly increased test scores in grade 4.
Our estimates show that test scores increased by 4 to 5 score points (out of 100) from grades 4 to 6, which amounts to an increase of about 12-15 score points if students are exposed to the intervention for six years of elementary school education (grades 1 to 6).
We also examine the effects of individual components of TEEP and find that school building constructions and renovations, instructional training of teachers, and additional textbook provision significantly increased student test scores. Interestingly, investments in textbooks for earlier grades have large positive effects on student performance at higher grades.
5
The paper is organized as follows: The next section describes the program. Sections 3 and 4 discuss data used in our analysis and our estimation method, respectively. Section 5 discloses the average treatment effects. The empirical results are summarized in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Program Background
The Third Elementary Education Project (TEEP) was implemented from 2000 to 2006 by the Philippine Department of Education in all public primary and elementary schools 4 in the 23 provinces 5 identified as the most socially depressed in the Social Reform Agenda.
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The total project cost was US$221.16 million ($91.07 million from JBIC and $82.84 million from World Bank, $47.25 million from the Philippine government). 7 The unique feature of TEEP is a combination of investments in school facility and education materials and school governance reform. Not only were school facilities and textbook supply improved, but the decisionmaking process was also decentralized to the school and community levels. TEEP introduced a package of investments to schools in the selected 23 provinces. Specifically, 4 Primary schools cover grades 1 to 4, while elementary schools cover grades 1 to 6. 5 The program covered both primary (grades 1-4) and elementary (grades 1-6) schools. This paper analyzes the impacts on only elementary schools. However, converting primary schools to elementary schools by extending enrollment up to grade 6 was also an important part of the TEEP program. Students who complete primary schools are likely to attend elementary schools in grades 5 and 6, which changes the student body of those schools between grades 1-4 and grades 5 and 6. 6 The Ramos administration, along with their medium term development plan, called Philippines 2000, identified reforms as the key to bridging social gaps and alleviating poverty. The objective of enhancing development through social reforms led to the formulation of the blueprint for social development in the Philippines, the Social Reform Agenda (SRA), marked as the first instance of social reforms in the history of the Philippines (Ramos 1995 6 the package of investments included (1) school building construction and renovation, (2) textbooks, (3) teacher training, (4) school-based management, and (5) other facility and equipment support. Note that except principal-led projects on school building, schools or communities did not influence initiation of the above interventions.
The core of the program is school-based management, through which schools are given an incentive to manage proactively and more independently of the government. Schools were partnered with communities and parents to decide key issues such as improvement plan and school finance. Teachers were also trained systematically to improve teaching skills.
Information management is being improved so that schools are responsible for systematically organizing information on enrollment, learning achievements, finance, and so forth and reporting it to the division office. Schools are required to set improvement plans every year and compare them with actual achievement. This dynamic process is monitored by the division-level education department. School finance is also being decentralized to some extent to relax the school budget constraints because Philippine public schools are not allowed to charge school fees. TEEP schools are free to raise their own funds from communities, parents, and others, though resources are admittedly limited in many poor communities. These reforms in public schools are expected to improve education quality, which would then in turn increase returns to schooling in labor markets (see Yamauchi 2005 , on returns to schooling).
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The selection of TEEP provinces was purposive because it intended to cover the most depressed provinces identified in the Social Reform Agenda. TEEP allocation is rather different in the Philippines' three macro-regions. As shown in Figure 2 .1, in the northern macroregion of Luzon, TEEP was concentrated in the Cordillera Administrative Region, a mountainous region in the center of northern Luzon. In the central macro-region of Visayas, TEEP divisions were relatively evenly distributed. In the southern Mindanao macro-region, TEEP divisions were clustered, though not as clustered as in northern Luzon.
TEEP was initially designed to follow a phase-in plan with three batches at the province level. However, the plan was altered in practice due to variations in preparedness across divisions. Because understanding the implementation process of TEEP is important in choosing the appropriate strategy to identify the TEEP impacts, we collected school-level data on program implementation time and investment amounts of different components.
Though the program implementation was substantially delayed, 8 it covered all schools in TEEP provinces. The data confirm that actual implementation did not follow the batch plan and suggest that the first and second batches were implemented almost simultaneously. 9 We will describe TEEP implementation in more detail in the data section.
Data
This section describes the data used in our analysis. collected well-managed school database before SY 2002/03, which makes it infeasible to examine the parallel trend assumption using the pre-intervention period.
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We obtain income data on municipalities (or school district) from the 2000 Census. Local income level is an important factor that determines school and family environments.
Controlling local income levels is crucial because competition between public and private schools matters in the selection of students in the Philippine context. In high-income municipalities (school districts), students from well-off families and with high test scores are likely to be accepted into private schools. Therefore, we expect differences in the ability distribution in public schools between high-and low-income municipalities. If school quality and student ability are complementary, the effect of TEEP on NAT change is expected to be different between high-and low-income districts.
We assigned an income category to each school district based on the 2000 Census. The census defined income category (ranking from 1, highest, to 6, lowest) for each municipality.
14 Note that some municipalities are split into a few school districts. In cities,
we ranked school districts as 1 based on the income threshold used for municipalities.
TEEP was implemented not randomly but in the divisions identified as socially most depressed in the presidential Social Reform Agenda. Figure 3 .1 shows the distribution of school districts by income category in TEEP and non-TEEP groups. School districts are concentrated in income categories 1, 4, and 5-that is, the highest income and the two lowest income rankings-for both TEEP and non-TEEP. Though we observe that more school districts are in income category 4 (and fewer in 1) in the TEEP group than in the non-TEEP group, the difference does not look significant. Further, Figure 3 .2 shows the distribution of schools in the TEEP and non-TEEP groups. Our basic observation remains valid here. Therefore, it is likely that we can find (and compare) school districts that share similar socioeconomic conditions in both TEEP and non-TEEP divisions.
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For TEEP implementation information, we have the Division Education Development Plan data, which was part of the TEEP completion reports. This dataset has aggregated TEEP inputs during SY 2000/01 to SY 2004/05. However, it does not identify implementation timing and inputs of different components of TEEP. Furthermore, the completeness and quality of the data substantially vary across divisions. To overcome this gap in the data, we visited 23 TEEP division offices to find the raw data on TEEP investments. The raw data we collected reveal details of different TEEP investments: textbooks, training, school-based management, school building, school innovation and improvement fund, equipment/furniture, and supplementary instructional materials. For training, we identified the starting date of teacher training and calculated the total number of man-15 In general, migration occurs from TEEP provinces since poverty rate is higher in those provinces. In the case of Visayas, we observe migrations to Manila and Cebu City (non-TEEP provinces which are not included in our analysis). Though the implementation of TEEP might have created an incentive for students to move from non-TEEP to TEEP schools, this is not realistic since many provinces are divided by mountains or sea (i.e., islands (disaggregated by grade and subject) were distributed to schools. In teacher training, we only used the initial time when training was introduced at the school district. Note that training covers a wide range of contents, which principals and teachers studied step by step. In many cases, training was conducted at the school district level. This means that instructors visit districts one by one within a division, and therefore it took them a few years to cover all the topics (our data show only total man-hours and the start date). The table shows that by SY 2002/03, about 80 percent of schools had received textbooks and 50 percent had at least one completed school building project. In all schools, the training process had just begun.
Estimation Method
In this section, we describe our estimation methods. Because the allocation of TEEP was purposive, the initial school conditions are likely to have different distributions in the treatment and control groups. If the initial conditions affect subsequent changes of the outcome variables, DD would give a biased estimate of the TEEP impacts. We use two strategies to deal with the potential bias due to nonrandom program placement. First, we use the sample from Visayas only. As shown in Figure 2 .1, TEEP divisions are relatively evenly distributed throughout Visayas compared with the other two macro-regions. We therefore expect that the TEEP and non-TEEP provinces are more comparable in Visayas, and hence our extra data collection and cleaning efforts were focused on Visayas. Second, we use propensity score (PS) matching to balance observable cohort characteristics and initial conditions between the treated and the control groups.
Because the original phase-in plan of TEEP was not strictly followed in the first two batches in practice, we cannot explore the pipeline design to identify the impact of TEEP on school performance. In this process, however, all schools in TEEP provinces were covered in the program. We also use all schools in non-TEEP provinces in the same region (regions 6, 7
and 8 of Visayas in our case). Therefore, we formed a control group based on all the schools in the non-TEEP provinces to estimate the counterfactual of the TEEP schools.
Three caveats exist in our method. First, our baseline is not free of contamination. Table 3 We use a PS-matched kernel method and a PS-weighted regression method (Hirano, Imbens, and Ridder 2003) . The PS-matched method estimates
where 1 N is the number of treated schools and ij W is the weight corresponding to school i (treated) and j (untreated); and
where (.) G is a kernel function and n b is a bandwidth parameter. We use bootstrapping with 100 replications to estimate the standard errors for the PS-matched kernel method.
We choose the PS-matched kernel method instead of the more commonly used nearestneighbor matching to obtain valid bootstrapped standard errors Imbens 2006, 2008) .
The PS-weighted method recovers an estimate of the ATET as the parameter β in a weighted least square regression of the form
where weights equal 1 for treated and
for nontreated observations. See
Chen, Mu, and Ravallion (2009) for empirical applications of these two methods.
Since ATET can be estimated consistently only in the common support region of X, the choice of trimming method is important. We follow Crump et al. (2009) to determine the common support region by
where
and otherwise solves
This method minimizes the variance of the estimated ATET.
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Average Treatment Effects
In The first-stage logit regression result is reported in Table 5 .1. The dependent variable is 1 if the school is located in a TEEP area and zero otherwise. The results show that income categories, distinguished by regions, significantly explain TEEP placement. Except for income category 5, which is the poorest group, the effect is monotonic. In region 7, central Visayas, which is omitted as the benchmark case, the effect of income category 5 is negative. In other regions, western and eastern Visayas, the income effect is monotonic throughout all income classes.
The pseudo R-squared of the logit regression is 0.22, which suggests plausible explanatory power. The PS of each observation is estimated based on the regression. Figure A. 1, in the Appendix, plots densities of the estimated PS in the treatment and control groups as well as the cut-point of the PS values above which observations are trimmed. To illustrate the effects of trimming and reweighting, Table A .1 displays simple differences of the explanatory variables between the treatment and control groups in the untrimmed sample and the PS weighted and trimmed samples. Although simple differences between the groups are large and statistically significant in the untrimmed sample, trimming and matching based on the propensity score eliminates all significant differences.
In Table 5 That is, it is likely that TEEP schools (and school districts) would tend to have a lower trend in NAT than non-TEEP schools if TEEP were not in place.
To check robustness of our results, we use alternative matching methods based on the nearest neighbor and 5 nearest neighbors and matching based on radius less than 0.05 and radius less than 0.1. For each of the matching methods, we use two trimming methods. One method is the same as described in section 4. The other method trims off treatment observations whose PS score is higher than the maximum or less than the minimum the PS score of the controls. The estimation results are summarized in Table A .2. The results suggest that TEEP effects are statistically significant for both overall score and math score for each combination of matching and trimming methods. The estimated magnitudes are close to those from our main result. The ATET ranges from 3.60 to 4.78 for overall score and from 4.82 to 7.07 for math score over these combinations.
Component-wise Analysis
The previous analysis suggests that TEEP, as a whole, has a significant effect on school performance. Because TEEP is a combination of several components, in this section we explore how each component contributes to school performance. 21 To do so, we specify the empirical model as Investments in training include instruction training and subjective training of teacher.
Investments in building refer to the number of new school constructions and new renovations. z is a vector of the initial district-and school-level conditions including the interactions of municipality-level income categories and regional dummies, pupil-teacher ratio, grade 4 enrollment, number of multi-grade classes, and proportion of local funded teachers. We note that the initial human capital and TEEP investments are potentially 21 School building construction and renovation projects were grouped into two types: local government led and school principal led. In school principal-led projects, schools can propose construction/renovation projects under the condition that they contribute to the funding and actual implementation (e.g., fund raising with communities, labor services). 22 For example, grade 4 textbook refers to the textbooks distributed to grade 4 in SY 2002/03. The grade 4 textbook distributed to grade 4 in SY 2003/04 is not counted because it did not benefit our cohort. For each grade, the value of new textbooks distributed was divided by the number of students enrolled in the corresponding grade. The total enrollment changes over grades since some students cannot progress to the next grade (i.e., repeating or dropout). Some students also transfer from primary to elementary schools at grade 5. We decided to use the enrollment of each grade to normalize the value of new textbooks, but we could also divide it by the initial grade-4 enrollment. Preliminary analysis showed that the results are qualitatively the same.
20
complementary (and thus not separable), but we assume that the initial school conditions are sufficient to control such heterogeneities in the intervention effect.
The results are presented in Table 6 Finally, in this study, we did not explicitly assess school-based management, mainly because we did not find appropriate input measures and variations. The batch plan was not strictly implemented especially in the first and second batch groups (that is, they were mixed in reality, depending on the updated preparedness at the division level). This soft component is thought to improve the overall effectiveness of physical investments and teacher training.
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Conclusion
This paper provided evidence from the Philippines that both physical and soft components of public school education investments significantly increased national achievement test scores. If the marginal effect is constant across all grades, our estimates indicate that the six-year exposure increases the score by about 12-15 points. Our study also showed that the performance in mathematics is more positively responsive to education reform and investments than other subjects. Our results, however, also depend on the validity of various assumptions made in our methodological approach.
Second, we also found evidence that early-stage investments improve student performance at later stages in the elementary school cycle. The distribution of grade 4 textbooks is shown to increase subsequent student test scores more than grade 5 or grade 6 textbooks do. This is not surprising due to the cumulative nature of knowledge acquisition (not just in education), but this dynamic production cannot be identified without exogenous variations in the inputs. Our results imply that improved educational quality at the elementary school stage has positive impacts on educational progress at later stages.
The above findings, when combined with evidence in the literature, imply that public investments in elementary education likely have positive longer term impacts on education performance at the subsequent stages: for example, progression to high schools and colleges and academic performance. If so, social returns to an early-stage investment can
be greater than what the current study seems to show. This argument justifies large public 23 investments to improve school quality at the early stage of public education, because the cumulative benefits are gradually realized at later stages in the education system and labor markets.
The competition between public and private schools is a unique feature of the Philippine education system due to the historical dominance of private institutions. In this context, some studies support an ability-screening hypothesis that private schools screen highability students but their actual schooling investments are not contributing to productivity increase (see, for example, Yamauchi 2005) . The ability screening with the private-public competition, given high costs of private schools, is socially inefficient. If publicly subsidized
and high-quality education is available, we also expect the inflow of good students into the public school system in the long run. 0.219 Note: *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. difference, PS: Propensity score, se: Standard errors, diff: mean-difference, *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. Trimming method 1: Trimming off treatment observations whose PS score is higher than the maximum or less than the minimum the PS score of the controls.
Standard errors in parentheses
Trimming method 2: as described in section 4.
Standard errors (in the parentheses) are not bootstrapped. 
